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Although the notion of exceptionality is certainly present in the discourses surrounding the introduction, scrutiny and application of counterterrorism laws, they do not involve a sovereign suspension of the law or the constitution. Their purported 'exceptionality' is reflected in special police and executive powers, expedited legislative process, a discourse of exceptionality and in special scrutiny and oversight mechanisms such as sunset clauses and annual reviews. But in constitutional terms they are normal pieces of legislation. The UK does have a law governing the formal declaration of states of emergency in the form of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (which also updated and replaced previous laws), but no recent government has invoked this power.
The idea behind this model is that new counterterrorism laws are used to create additional police and executive powers for pursuing, apprehending and interfering with potential terrorists and their activities, but do not create new criminal offences of 'terrorism'. The 1972 Diplock Report established the principles of this approach, though it should be noted that the aim was to remove the distinction between political grievance and crime in order to remove political legitimacy from the IRA.
Nevertheless, since then new 'terrorist' offences have indeed been created, largely for symbolic effect as they often relate to activity covered by offences in existing counterterrorism law or the regular criminal law (Donohue 2000: 197-98) .
To make the executive powers created by counterterrorism laws compatible with the European convention on human rights (ECHR), successive British governments have had to invoke derogations under Article 15 (Hickman 2005; Marks 1995) 
. Until 2000
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Lawmaking is cumulative, with each law always in a relationship to others, adding to them, amending them, replacing them, or in the case of security laws, often escalating their provisions beyond what was regarded as 'exceptional' the last time around. In the UK, counterterrorism lawmaking takes place within a long historical context that is not captured by the 'ground zero', history erasing, temporal rupture logic of Schmittian exceptionalism and 9/11. Similarly, lawmaking does not involve the 'sovereign' executive branch of government alone and does not follow a clear binary logic of norm and exception.
We need three shifts in analytical focus away from the existing debate. First, instead of a concern with temporal rupture, we need a more complex understanding of temporality that considers unfolding historical context and the changing times of security emergencies. Second, instead of only considering sovereign or executive exceptionalism, if the problem is one of lawmaking we need a more complex understanding of politics that includes the other branches of government, particularly the legislature which has been almost completely neglected analytically. We should not assume that the legislature and judiciary are always supine rubberstamps for executive exceptionalism, even if at the moment of crisis they often appear to be. And third, instead of the binary logic of norm and exception, we need a more complex understanding of the unfurling relationship between the two. This article therefore looks closely at the legislative arm of government as a changing site of lawmaking and security politics over time. Through three examples drawn from between 1996 and 2011, in a context going back to the early 1970s, it analyses the effects of spectacular terrorist attacks on legislative practice, but compares that to what happens when the perceived emergency has receded into memory and when there is no perceived emergency. These examples are, first, the ATCSA 2001, which was enacted in the wake of 9/11 and is typical of the familiar British practice of legislating in a perceived security emergency; second, the 2008 Counter-Terrorism Act, which was enacted with difficulty when the impact of 9/11 and 7/7 had faded; and third, the 2000 Terrorism Act, which was enacted in light of the Northern Ireland peace process. The first represents legislative exceptionalism, the third represents an act of normalization, while the second represents something in between.
The empirical aspect of the research is a discourse analysis of Hansard (the parliamentary record), understood through the context of the structural power relationships within and between the executive and legislature (for more see Neal This is the Author's Final Version of International Political Sociology, 6(3), 260-276 doi: 10.1111 /j.1749 -5687.2012 Please refer to the published article for citation purposes. 7 forthcoming a)). Because of the conjoined relationship of the executive and legislature in the British system and the physical presence of the executive in the legislature, we can hear the contestation of new policies and laws played out in the debating chamber and committee rooms of parliament. In the debates, reports, inquiries, hearings and procedures of parliamentary politics, we find arguments, concerns, controversies, assurances and justifications that reflect not only immediate responses to security emergencies, but also lessons from decades of counterterrorism in Northern Ireland and concerns for the future consequences of legislative actions. In this way the article can compare the concerns and practices of parliamentary legislators in the aftermath of perceived emergencies with those brought into play at different legislative times.
i In so doing, the article explores the legislative dynamics of security politics beyond the moment of emergency and sovereign decision. Before we do that, we need to consider the political status and significance of parliament.
Parliament (why it is interesting despite its weakness)
If the legislative arm of government has been neglected in existing debates on security politics, this is because critical academic focus has been focused on sovereign or executive power following Schmitt, but also on the proliferation of technologies of security that reach far beyond the traditional institutions of government. (This neglect is an also an effect of security studies being a sub-discipline of international relations, which has tended to refer 'domestic factors' to political science. For an extended version of this argument see (Neal forthcoming b) From another perspective, a constitutional mantra of the British system of government is that 'parliament is sovereign ' (King 2007: 15-38 ), yet parliament is a weak institution that is in thrall to the executive and overshadowed by forms of governmentality. This is compounded in the field of security. Rarely willing or able to fundamentally alter the course of counterterrorism legislation, particularly in the wake of a terrorist attack, the legislature is a limited power that lacks resources in knowledge, security intelligence, innovative capacity and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1992; Williams 2007: 31) . Parliamentarians are yoked to the constitutional dominance of the executive with its control of timetabling and its demands for speed, to the constitutional traditions of cross party consensus (Donohue 2000: 296) and deference to the executive on security matters (Dyzenhaus 2005) , and to the exceptionalism of the moment of crisis and the fear of not being seen to act to prevent future attacks.
The only real symbol of parliamentary 'sovereignty' is its legislative power. And while this is a residual, perhaps anachronistic, aspect of the somewhat organic constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom (evolving from monarchy to executive-dominated constitutional monarchy), its ability to enact law is an august power, even though this usually amounts to giving assent to legislation introduced by the executive (Norton 2005: 7) . Foucault highlights the contrast between legislative sovereign power and its eclipse very well. He argues that on the hand the power to make the law is an imposing statement of sovereign potency. As he puts it in History of Sexuality, 'power acts by laying down the rule… It speaks, and that is the rule. The pure form of power resides in the function of the legislator ' (1990: 83 (Foucault 1990: 89; cited in Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009: 22 ).
Yet although lawmaking represents a limited and archaic 'sovereign' power that has been superseded by governmentality and an ever-expanding range of executive powers, it is in its potential eclipse that parliament comes to express the most important tensions in the lawmaking model of security. Golder and Fitzpatrick argue that the established interpretation of Foucault on law is that he characterizes the power of the sovereign law as monotonous, limited, weak, repressive and negative, retreating in the face of ever more creative, productive, extensive and affective forms of governmental power such as discipline and biopower (for example Hunt and Wickham 1994 ). Yet through a Derridean re-reading of Foucault's thoughts on law, particularly in his lectures, Golder and Fitzpatrick argue that law presents an excess 'which is illimitable and always going beyond itself and those who would seek to instrumentalize it ' (2009: 39) . This reading is insightful of the position of parliament in legislative security politics and of the ineluctable normalization of the 'exceptional'. On the one hand parliament plays a central role in legitimating the symbolic and repressive legislation that is invariably enacted in the wake of spectacular terrorist attacks, but on the other hand parliament frequently expresses concerns about how the law may exceed its intentions, scrutiny and oversight. As we will see, parliamentary discourse raises concerns that include: past mistakes being repeated, new executive powers being misused, minority communities being alienated, non-terrorist groups being brought within the remit of the definition of terrorism, and deleterious effects on politics itself. Arguably, much of this has come to pass. This illimitable process of law going beyond itself is never more the case than with the normalization of counterterrorism law.
Lawmaking in an emergency (legislative exceptionalism): the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and others
Speed is a characteristic feature of counterterrorist lawmaking in the wake of terrorist attacks. Normally in parliament, convention dictates that when proposed legislation is introduced in the form of a bill, there are several stages it must go through in the Commons and the Lords before it can become law, which include parliamentary debates over principle and detail, scrutiny in committees and the tabling of amendments. Most stages are separated by at least two weekends (Parliament 2011) .
When all the stages from 'first reading' to 'royal assent' are added up, the normal passage of a bill would take a minimum of eight to ten weeks. However, because the government controls legislative timetabling in the Commons it can override these conventions. It can also exhort the more independent House of Lords to follow suit, particularly when there is popular and symbolic pressure to act. This is overwhelmingly the experience of counterterrorist lawmaking in the wake of terrorist attacks, which is almost always rushed, reactive and repetitious.
Former Northern Ireland human rights commissioner Brice Dickson told a recent
Lords inquiry into fast-track legislation: 'very often in the aftermath of a terrorist atrocity, politicians must be seen to be doing something, and there is a public mood because it institutionalizes the 'principle of fallibility of opinion ' (2004: 332 ). Yet during security emergencies, parliament gives the executive the benefit of the doubt, accepts its assessments of the threat, accedes to its legislative demands and indeed participates in a discourse of fear. The legislature's position of constitutional weakness and its lack of access to government intelligence means it rarely has the means or symbolic authority to do otherwise. It is for all these reasons that counterterrorist lawmaking in the wake of an emergency follows its familiar pattern.
In contrast, when counterterrorist lawmaking occurs away from the immediate influence of 'emergencies' it is much more consultative and deliberative, but this poses its own problems as we will discuss later.
Parliamentary safeguards: 'Exceptional measures require exceptional scrutiny'
Despite all this, the legislature is not completely supine, even in an emergency. The parliamentary record shows that although opposition parties and backbenchers always support new legislation at these times, they are still concerned about potential negative consequences in terms of lack of effectiveness, expansion of executive power and potential impact on rights, liberties and suspect communities. The legislation was published in draft ten weeks before its second reading, which although becoming a more common practice is still unusual for most legislation, let alone for counterterrorism legislation. This allowed time for evidence to be taken and 19 responses from us', ix the crux of her argument was not about new threats or a recent crisis but about hypothetical future risks. As she said in her much interrupted speech:
The measures in the Bill are precautionary, proportionate and necessary if we are to have in place protections to deal with the exceptional circumstances that none of us wants to see happen, but which all of us have a duty to prepare for, in case they do.
x
In circumstances without an obvious emergency, opposition from across the house was emboldened, in contrast to the usual cross-party consensus that ensues in perceived emergency situations. Hypothetical risks proved more open to contest than spectacular images of destruction still burned fresh on the collective memory.
Without the symbolic, informational and institutional advantages accorded to the executive by such 'exceptional' moments, and because of a consultation process that had been slow, broad and largely open, the executive found it much harder to assert authority over the arguments and evidence. A great deal of the expert evidence had been put into the public domain thanks to the hearings held by parliamentary committees, and it was thus much harder for the executive to make its interpretation of the security situation seem both unequivocal and urgent. When the home secretary cited one authoritative police source on the need for extended police powers of precharge detention, xi her shadow David Davis cited similarly authoritative sources that were much more equivocal:
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The head of MI5 has not even mentioned pre-charge detention when setting out the security challenges that we face, whether briefing in public or in private on Privy Council terms. The most that the Home Secretary can cite is Sir Ian Blair, who offers no evidence at all but merely draws a "pragmatic inference"-her words-that we might at some unspecified point in the future, faced with some unspecified threat, require an unspecified extension of detention without charge. 
Legislating without an emergency, or acts of normalization: the Terrorism Act 2000
The Terrorism Act 2000 was not 'emergency' or 'exceptional' legislation, and nor was it ever justified as such. Rather it was the opposite: an attempt to rationalize and normalize counterterrorism law in a considered, deliberative, consultative manner, away from the symbolic and political pressures brought about by terrorist attacks.
The process by which the Terrorism Act 2000 was made was therefore markedly different to the usual experience of rushed, reactive and repetitious counterterrorism legislation that is enacted on an assumed 'temporary' basis but inevitably remains in force. In effect, between the 1996 Lloyd report and the publication of the Terrorism Bill in 1999, the legislation underwent an informal three-year consultation process.
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The whole process aimed to end the previously unsatisfactory way in which counterterrorism had been made.
Lloyd had been asked to consider whether there was a need for continuing counterterrorism laws in prospect of peace in Northern Ireland. After consulting with various security 'experts', in particular the academic Paul Wilkinson, he concluded that there was: 'Once lasting peace has been established in Northern Ireland, there will continue to be a need for permanent counter-terrorist legislation to deal with the threat of international and domestic terrorism ' (1996: 12) . The main effect of the act was to make permanent many of the 'temporary' and 'exceptional' powers contained in the PTA and EPA. Many of these powers had applied only to Northern Ireland, but those that were kept were now to apply to the entire UK. The new act removed the 'more extreme' xv powers of internment and exclusion orders (a form of internal exile that excluded individuals from either the territory of Northern Ireland or mainland Britain), though it should be noted that forms of these powers later came back in the Belmarsh detention regime and in certain aspects of control orders.
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A perverse effect of removing the notion of exceptionalism from the legislative discourse was that pressure from parliament for exceptional scrutiny also dissipated.
Walker describes the level of scrutiny in the legislative process and the resultant review mechanisms as disappointing (2009: 25) . Although concern was expressed in parliament that many of the review mechanisms that had made the PTA and EPA palatable were to go, this did not translate into strong opposition from the frontbenches of the other parties or a divisive fight over amendments. Indeed, the initial draft bill proposed no review mechanisms at all. Despite the professed magnanimity, this outcome amounted to weak scrutiny. Being a permanent piece of legislation there was now no mechanism to cause it lapse after a This is the Author's Final Version of 1749-5687.2012.00163.x Please refer to the published article for citation purposes.
24 period of time. Lib Dem home affairs spokesperson Simon Hughes had tabled an amendment calling for five yearly renewals by parliament (in effect once a parliamentary term), but after not arguing his case well in the bill committee and being persuaded otherwise by Clarke, he withdrew his new clause. xviii Clarke's argument was that having reviews only every five years would constrain the freedom of the independent reviewer and was not frequent enough for the law to be adapted in response to changes in security circumstances or negative judicial rulings on its use.
While this may have been true, it somewhat diverted the point. The provision for independent yearly review presented no opportunity for parliament to debate the findings without the agreement of the government to program time for it, and in any such event there would be no possibility for any amendment or parliamentary refusal to renew the legislation without the government deciding to reopen the legislative process. This took away the onus on the government to defend the use of, and ongoing need for, the legislation and placed such judgment firmly with the executive.
This was in fact the intention of the government. As Clarke said:
It is important that the Secretary of State of the time makes a judgment as to how effectively or otherwise the legislation has operated. That is principally a matter for the Executive to consider, although of course the reviewer may comment on that.
xix So perversely, despite the long consultation process and the normalization of exceptional counterterrorism law represented by the bill, its effect was to reinforce the executive dominance over security issues characteristic of the 'emergency' legislation This is the Author's Final Version of 1749-5687.2012.00163.x Please refer to the published article for citation purposes.
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it was meant to end. Moreover, as the conservative David Liddington pointed out, the legislation did not close the door to the possibility of further knee-jerk legislative responses in the event of new terrorist atrocities, and nor would have Hughes's amendments.
xx Although the Lib Dems offered the most considered response to the bill, they did not entirely appreciate its implications. The normalization of counterterrorism law, which they supported in principle, undermined the rationale for the principle of exceptional scrutiny that had operated previously. Hughes outlined the position of his party as follows:
We believe that we should codify and simplify existing exceptional legislation on terrorism, repeal unnecessary measures, especially the sort of legislation that we passed last year in haste [the1998 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act], and ensure regular scrutiny of counter-terrorist legislation on a United Kingdom-wide basis. We approach the debate from that perspective. We support a United Kingdom-wide Bill. We also support reconsidering a series of existing temporary measures and bringing them together. However, we have fundamental anxieties about the Government's conclusion to that process… We believe that exceptional measures require exceptional scrutiny.
xxi [my italics]
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exceptional. Consolidating temporary measures and applying the legislation to the whole of the UK amounted to normalization. The logic had changed, and so the rationale for exceptional scrutiny no longer applied.
Given the 'exceptional' counterterrorism laws that came after 9/11, the Terrorism Act Under a normalized counterterrorism regime, in the absence of powerful parliamentary review and renewal mechanisms mobilized by a sense of emergency, parliament would have to rely on much weaker and less formal limits, such as the judgment of the home secretary, the assurances of the government about how the law would be used, the assessment of the independent reviewer, and the discretion of the police, courts and crown prosecution service on how to apply and interpret the law.
Some parliamentarians expressed doubt about the value of these assurances. International Political Sociology, 6(3), 260-276 doi: 10.1111 /j.1749 -5687.2012 Please refer to the published article for citation purposes.
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terrorism presented an inherent possibility of excessive application, but in practice it is 'often moderated by police and prosecution restraint ' (2009: 12) .
The However, legislative normalization presents a surprising research finding. While we know very well the argument that exceptional times require exceptional measures, there is also a powerful parliamentary principle that exceptional measures require exceptional scrutiny. Yet although acts of normalization tend to receive a great deal of critical debate, the parliamentary response ultimately tends to be weak because it is not galvanized by the discourse of exceptionalism. The principle of exceptional scrutiny that applies when emergencies are in play does not work with normalization.
Hence normalization tends to result in weak post-legislative safeguards and an entrenchment of executive security prerogative, despite the fact that it appears to display several liberal democratic virtues.
During episodes of perceived emergency, the principle of exceptional scrutiny does not necessarily mean greater political opposition, but rather a discourse of consensus to tackle terrorism accompanied by an insistence on parliamentary safeguards to try to ensure that what is justified as exceptional stays exceptional. These safeguards are by no means perfect and often apply to only the more headline-grabbing measures, but they are something rather than nothing and they can cause contentious counterterrorist powers to lapse in time. 
